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Abstract
Infections are among the most important occupational risks for 
healthcare workers. Some infections can be prevented through 
vaccination but, in other cases, there are no vaccines to prevent 
them, as happens with infections from antimicrobial-resistant 
organisms. Precautions related with transmission route and 
contact isolation or respiratory isolation are very important in 
order to protect healthcare workers and other patients. In this 
paper, the authors reviewed biological hazards for healthcare 
workers and described the procedures undertaken by an oc-
cupational health department (OHD) of a Portuguese hospital 
where vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (VRSA) was 
isolated from a patient, for the first time in Europe. After the 
VRSA strain isolation, healthcare workers were instructed to 
adopt contact preventive measures. Nasal swabs were cultured 
weekly in 33 healthcare workers for several weeks until the pa-
tients’ culture changed to negative. In the meantime, OHD pre-
pared actions to adopt in case of VRSA colonization or infection 
in healthcare workers.
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by S. Karger AG, Basel 
on behalf of NOVA National School of Public Health
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Resumo
As infeções constituem um importante grupo de riscos de 
natureza ocupacional para profissionais de saúde. Embo-
ra a vacinação seja uma forma eficaz de prevenir muitas 
infeções, algumas delas não dispõem de vacinas dis-
poníveis. Os autores sintetizam neste artigo as principais 
vias de transmissão ocupacional de microrganismos a 
profissionais de saúde, dando enfase à transmissão de mi-
crorganismos resistentes a antibióticos que constituem 
um novo desafio em saúde ocupacional. Neste contexto, 
descrevem os procedimentos adotados pelo Serviço de 
Saúde Ocupacional de um hospital universitário portu-
guês perante uma situação de exposição ocupacional de 
profissionais de saúde a um doente infetado com Staphy-
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lococcus aureus resistente à vancomicina (VRSA), o pri-
meiro caso isolado na Europa. Depois do isolamento do 
agente, os profissionais foram instruídos para adotar as 
medidas de prevenção por contacto, efetuou-se a cultura 
das secreções nasais desses 33 profissionais semanal-
mente e estabeleceram-se os procedimentos a adotar pe-
rante colonização ou infeção dos profissionais de saúde.
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by S. Karger AG, Basel 
on behalf of NOVA National School of Public Health
Introduction
In hospitals, healthcare workers do a wide range of 
tasks, most of them related with patients’ care. While per-
forming their work, they are potentially exposed to many 
occupational hazards, including physical, chemical, bio-
logical, ergonomic-related, and psychological hazards. 
They can interact among each other in a complex way. 
For example, some health effects caused by biological 
agents can be prevented through vaccination, and the im-
mune response can be affected by chronic stress [1]. In 
some circumstances, exposures to occupational hazards 
can be related to occupational diseases, work-related dis-
eases, or occupational accidents. On the one hand, it is 
known that workers in healthcare settings and social 
workers have the fourth-highest rate of work-related dis-
eases [2]. On the other hand, exposure to biological oc-
cupational hazards seems to be particularly prevalent in 
the healthcare sector [3]. In hospitals, infections are 
among the most important risks for healthcare workers. 
Most occupational health departments have well-orga-
nized programs, including vaccination programs, to pre-
vent and to deal with some well-known biological haz-
ards. Every once in a while, there comes the need to de-
velop an action plan to deal with a new situation, as 
happens with infections from antimicrobial-resistant or-
ganisms. In this paper, we synthetize some information 
related with biological hazards to healthcare workers and 
we describe a specific occupational work situation, with a 
potential exposure of healthcare workers to vancomycin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus in a European university 
hospital. 
Biological Hazards in Healthcare Settings 
Healthcare workers undertake their jobs in different 
workplaces in the hospital, doing a large range of activi-
ties. Therefore, they are potentially exposed to many 
sources of infection. Laboratory workers are exposed to 
biological hazards during collecting or processing biolog-
ical materials, while physicians and nurses are especially 
exposed when they perform surgical or invasive proce-
dures, when they treat wounds, or when they take body 
fluid samples. Exposure to biological hazards is also com-
mon when nurses and nurse assistants take care of pa-
tients incapable of looking after themselves or when doc-
tors make clinical examinations. Doing other activities, 
such as disinfecting, cleaning, transporting contaminated 
equipment, or working in contaminated areas, can also 
expose nurse assistants or other hospital workers to bio-
logical hazards in healthcare settings [4, 5]. 
The essential routes for the transmission of infections 
in healthcare settings are bloodborne, droplet, airborne, 
fecal-oral, and contact routes [6]. The main occupational 
risk for acquiring a blood pathogen in the healthcare set-
ting, namely hepatitis B, C, and D viruses or human im-
munodeficiency virus (HIV), is a percutaneous sharp in-
jury with a contaminated needle or other sharp object. 
Other possible routes of transmission include accidental 
exposure to blood or other organic fluids through a work-
er’s broken skin or mucous membranes. The risk of trans-
mission of bloodborne viruses following a single percuta-
neous exposure to blood containing a bloodborne virus 
depends upon several factors, but the average risk has 
been estimated to be the following: hepatitis B virus 33.3% 
(1 in 3), hepatitis C virus 3.3% (1 in 30), and HIV 0.31% 
(1 in 319) [7]. A wide range of other microbiologic agents 
can be transmitted by percutaneous injury and they have 
to be considered if the patient has a known infection. 
Ebola virus is a very serious biological hazard transmitted 
by direct or indirect contact with organic fluids of infect-
ed patients. It is of great concern especially in some dense-
ly populated African regions, where an overlap between 
human and animal ecosystems exist, including primates 
and bats who are Ebola reservoirs. Nevertheless, this has 
also been a relevant problem for healthcare workers from 
Europe or North America who had worked with patients 
from countries where the infection is endemic or during 
epidemics [4, 5]. 
Airborne-transmitted infections include: measles, tu-
berculosis, chickenpox, and severe acute respiratory syn-
drome. Transmission of tuberculosis, caused by Myco-
bacterium tuberculosis, is a well-recognized risk to pa-
tients and healthcare workers. Microscopic droplets or 
droplet nuclei are produced by coughing, sneezing, and 
talking from patients with respiratory tuberculosis and 
they can remain suspended in the air for long periods and 
be dragged by air currents. The risk for healthcare work-
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ers is higher when they perform some procedures where 
there is an increased exposure to tracheobronchial secre-
tions, such as inducing sputum, secretion aspiration, 
bronchoscopies, autopsies, sputum testing, extubating/
intubating, and oral care, among others [6]. Prevention 
measures and medical monitoring of healthcare workers 
are useful to control occupational tuberculosis. The diag-
nosis of latent tuberculosis, which can be treated, in this 
way avoiding its progression to active tuberculosis, can be 
made by occupational health departments using tubercu-
lin skin test and, more recently, interferon gamma release 
assays [8]. Rubella, measles, mumps, and varicella can be 
prevented through vaccination and must be considered 
an occupational hazard. Workers from pediatric depart-
ments and those working with immunocompromised pa-
tients, as in infectious diseases, hematology, oncology, 
and posttransplant wards, seem to have a higher risk of 
exposure. Meningitis, influenza, and other respiratory in-
fections are spread through contact of infected respira-
tory secretions with healthcare workers’ mucosae; there-
fore, the use of a chirurgical mask can significantly reduce 
the risk of transmission. Some of those infections, such as 
flu, can be prevented through vaccination. 
Salmonella spp., Shigella spp., Campylobacter jejuni/
coli, Yersinia enterocolitica, enteropathogenic Escherichia 
coli, enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli, rotaviruses, Clos-
tridium difficile, and Vibrio cholerae are among the most 
serious agents that can be transmitted to healthcare work-
ers by the fecal-oral route [4]. Skin infection agents, such 
as scabies agent or herpes simplex virus 1 or 2, are trans-
mitted by contact and they often infect healthcare work-
ers. Enterococcus faecium, Staphylococcus aureus, Klebsi-
ella pneumoniae, Acinetobacter baumannii, Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa, and Enterobacter spp. can be transmitted by 
contact too, but usually they do not cause infection in 
healthy people. Nevertheless, in some circumstances, they 
can cause serious health problems, namely pneumonia or 
infecting wounds. On the other hand, as healthcare work-
ers become colonized with these agents, they can act as a 
vehicle for nosocomial dissemination. These factors are of 
special concern in healthcare settings, especially if they 
acquire resistance to antibiotics (Table 1). 
Antimicrobial-Resistant Microorganisms as an 
Example of a New Challenge for Occupational Health 
and Safety Departments in Hospitals 
Bacteria can develop resistance to antimicrobial agents. 
Antimicrobial-resistant organisms are one of the most se-
rious health threats in healthcare settings for patients and 
for workers [9]. Healthcare workers are more likely ex-
posed to antimicrobial-resistant organisms when they are 
taking care of their patients, particularly when patients 
are treated with large-spectrum antibiotics for a long pe-
riod of time and when they are highly susceptible to infec-
tions [9]. 
As antimicrobial-resistant organisms spread in the 
same way as antimicrobial-susceptible ones, some disin-
fection control practices can prevent cross-contamina-
tion between patients and workers of both types of micro-
organisms. Those preventive practices include simple 
measures, such as washing hands and changing gloves be-
fore and after contact with patients [9], and other contact 
preventive measures, such as isolating infected or colo-
nized patients. The hospital’s policy towards a rational 
use of antibiotics is also very important. 
Most of the time, healthcare workers can be carriers of 
pathogenic agents, including antimicrobial-resistant or-
ganisms, without developing infections. Nevertheless, 
sometimes an active infection may arise, being more sus-
ceptible if they have an existing severe illness, such as 
chronic renal disease, chronic respiratory disease among 
other chronic comorbidities and immunodepressive 
states. Other risk factors include recent antibiotherapy 
agents or healthcare workers undergoing an invasive pro-
cedure [10]. Some examples of antimicrobial-resistant 
organisms are methicillin/oxacillin-resistant Staphylo-
Table 1. Some biological hazards for healthcare workers by routes of transmission
Bloodborne Droplet Airborne Fecal-oral Direct contact
Hepatitis B virus Influenza virus Measles virus Escherichia coli Sarcoptes scabiei
Hepatitis C virus Rubella virus Mycobacterium tuberculosis Salmonella spp. Herpes simplex virus 1 or 2
Hepatitis D virus Neisseria meningitidis Varicella zoster virus Campylobacter jejuni/coli Pseudomonas aeruginosa
Human immunodeficiency
virus
Mumps virus Rotavirus Vancomycin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus
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coccus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant Staphylo-
coccus aureus (VRSA), vancomycin-resistant enterococci 
(VRE), multi-resistant Escherichia coli and Salmonella, 
penicillin-resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae, carbapen-
em-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae, carbapenem-resis-
tant Acinetobacter baumannii, carbapenem-resistant 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and multidrug-resistant and 
extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis [9]. 
MRSA is a persistent problem in European hospitals, 
since the bacteria usually does not respond to the treatment 
with common antibiotics and it causes a high incidence of 
morbidity and mortality. These bacteria are highly resistant 
to dry and warm conditions and can survive as biofilms 
over inorganic environments (such as surfaces of medical 
devices) for a long period of time. The route of their trans-
mission is through direct contact or via droplets. [6]. 
Vancomycin remains one of the first-line options for 
the treatment of infections with MRSA. Therefore, the 
emergence of vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus au-
reus can create a very serious problem as there is low 
availability of alternative treatment and over the last two 
decades, there has been a significant retraction of invest-
ment towards antimicrobial research and development 
by the major pharmaceutical companies. Special con-
cerns about VRSA exist in countries with a high preva-
lence of MRSA and VRE, because VRE can act as donors 
of genetic elements conferring resistance of MRSA to 
vancomycin. The first VRSA was identified and isolated 
in 2002 in the United States of America [11]. From 2002 
to 2006, seven patients with Van-A VRSA were identified, 
all of them with a history of enterococcal infection or col-
onization and MRSA, underlying conditions, and vanco-
mycin therapy prior to their VRSA infection [11]. 
Potential Exposure to VRSA of Healthcare Workers in 
an Occupational Context
The first case of VRSA infection identified in Europe 
was isolated in a central hospital of Lisbon in May 2013 
[12]. A hospitalized 74-year-old female patient with dia-
betes mellitus type 2, terminal chronic renal failure requir-
ing hemodialysis, and peripheral vascular disease under-
went amputation of two gangrenous toes. The resistant 
bacteria were recovered from pus of the toe amputation 
wound. At the time, the patient was being treated with 
vancomycin and amikacin because Pseudomonas aerugi-
nosa and vancomycin-susceptible MRSA were previously 
isolated (March 2013) and she had clear signs of infection 
in the wound of the amputation site. Vancomycin-resis-
tant Enterococcus faecalis and a VRSA strain (vancomycin 
minimum inhibitory concentration of 1,024 μg/mL, de-
termined by broth microdilution method according to the 
Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute guidelines) 
[13] harboring the vanA gene were isolated, along with 
vanA-positive vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecalis 
and Pseudomonas aeruginosa [14]. 
Procedures Adopted in the Hospital 
After internal report of the situation by the microbio-
logical department of the hospital, there was the involve-
ment of several departments, including the occupational 
health department and the infection control committee. 
Some of the procedures immediately adopted included the 
reinforcement of infection control precautions and the 
monitoring of a possible dissemination of the VRSA strain 
in the hospital. The patient was initially screened for colo-
nization by culturing swabs obtained from nares, axillae, 
perineum, and groin. Subsequently, she was weekly 
screened for nasal colonization until discharge from the 
hospital. Nasal swabs were also cultured from a total of 53 
patients with whom she had close contact, including house-
hold members, 47 healthcare workers, and patients under 
hemodialysis in the same room as the index patient [14]. 
Procedures Adopted by the Occupational Health 
Department 
The patient was isolated and a restricted number of 
healthcare workers was selected and monitored while 
providing healthcare to the patient with VRSA infection. 
It was essential to limit and hold the patient’s in-hospital 
care to the same healthcare workers throughout her hos-
pital stay. Those healthcare workers were instructed to 
follow strict contact preventive measures in this context. 
We also produced an internal guideline to help the oc-
cupational health department to manage and to screen 
healthcare workers exposed to VRSA and having had to 
continue treating the patient with VRSA infection. Basi-
cally, it included some actions to be operated in this situ-
ation, such as: 
 − Collecting weekly nasal swabs until the patient was 
clinically stable and cultures from her foot were nega-
tive for all the identified pathogens (August 2013);
 − Defining the exact procedures to be followed in case of 
proven colonization:
• Immediate healthcare worker dismissal from work-
place with justification of absences and payment; 
• Mupirocin 20 mg/g (nasal ointment), with applica-
tion t.i.d., for 8 days; 
• Search for eventual early signs of infection.
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The management of all the procedures in case of colo-
nization included a cooperation between the occupation-
al health department and other departments, namely the 
microbiologic department, the department of human re-
sources, and the hospital pharmacy (Table 2). 
Healthcare Workers’ Nasal Swabs Results 
From 47 healthcare workers who first had contact with 
the patient before VRSA was isolated and who were ini-
tially screened from VRSA colonization, we monitored 33 
hospital healthcare workers during 3 months (until Au-
gust). Those monitored were the healthcare workers who 
remained providing health care to the patient until cultures 
of patient wound showed negative results. VRSA was not 
isolated from any of the screened individuals. Neverthe-
less, we identified 5 healthcare workers colonized with 
MRSA and 15 healthcare workers with methicillin-suscep-
tible Staphylococcus aureus. Despite colonization, none of 
them showed signs of infection. We decided not to treat 
healthcare workers colonized with MRSA, once there was 
no evidence of epidemiologic transmission of MRSA. 
Discussion 
Healthcare workers are potentially exposed to a large 
number of microorganisms. Most of those biological haz-
ards are well known and occupational health departments 
in hospitals have developed programs to manage the poten-
tial occupational risks. Some examples are the programs to 
manage accidental exposures to bloodborne pathogens or 
to manage Mycobacterium tuberculosis exposure. 
Nevertheless, emergent risks have arisen, creating new 
challenges to occupational health departments, such as 
potential exposures to bacteria resistant to antibiotics. 
An example of a new challenge presented in this article 
concerns a situation of healthcare workers’ exposure to a 
patient with VRSA, the first known case in Europe. Fortu-
nately, and in agreement with the results of the epidemio-
logical studies conducted following isolation of VRSA 
strains in the USA [11, 15], transmission of VRSA identi-
fied in the index patient was not detected in healthcare 
workers, monitored during several weeks. The treatment 
of the patient with amikacin, daptomycin, and rifampicin 
during 6 weeks resulted in the nonidentification of the 
VRSA strain after 3 weeks. In addition to the positive re-
sponse to the established therapy, we believe that the strict 
compliance with infection control measures certainly 
contributed to the nondissemination of the VRSA strain.
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Table 2. Major procedures adopted by the occupational health department
1 Identification of all healthcare workers exposed to the patient
2 Nasal swabs of all healthcare workers previously identified
3 Selection of a restricted healthcare worker group to handle the infected patient
– Weekly nasal swab monitoring 
4 Cooperation with the infection control committee
– Reinforcement of infection control precautions
5 Cooperation with the microbiologic department
– Creation of a swift communication method for nasal swab results
6 Cooperation with the department of human resources 
– Creation of the possibility of immediate healthcare worker dismissal from workplace with absence justification and pay-
ment, in case of proven colonization or infection
7 Cooperation with the hospital pharmacy
– Supply of mupirocin for all colonized or infected healthcare workers
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